

# ISLAMOPHOBIA: MYTH OF ISLAMIC THREAT IN INDONESIA, 2001-2004

---

Lili Yulyadi Arnakim

## Abstract

*Muslims in Indonesia, with extension to Southeast Asia are moderate and known as Muslim smiling faces. However, being the largest Muslim populated nation across the Muslim world, Indonesia has been alleged as hotbed of terrorist in Southeast Asia barely after the September 11 tragedy. Indonesia became the most fragile target of the terrorist attack in the form of bomb explosions. Since Bali bombing in 2002, Indonesian government has been facing the terror from so-called "Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI)" which has been associated as Southeast Asia regional network of al-Qaeda, an international terrorist organization based in Afghanistan. As such, this paper attempts to analyze Islamic threat in Indonesia where a terrorist group known JI is allegedly growing. Using an analytical approach of certain media, this paper finds that Islamic threat has been in the form of alarming account, and too much politicized in the expense of Islamist groups. This paper also provides some interpretation of JI and the myth of Islamic threat which is associated with it in Southeast Asia.*

## Introduction

Muslims in Indonesia are moderate and known as Muslim smiling faces. As being the largest Muslim nation, Indonesia was accused as source of Islamic terrorism in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Islamic threat has not been proportionally perceived. With the emergence of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, Islam was unjustly reported and dealt across the western as well as Muslim world. From al-Qaeda to Jama'ah Islamiyah at the Southeast Asian region, media, especially the western media, plays a significant role in pursuing the discourse. The Islamic threat in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia, has been exaggeratedly alarmed by the western media and some prolific writers. Consequently, western perceptions of Islam in Indonesia have been fed by the Media- the press, radio and television - which often seems obsessed with the threat posed by 'fundamentalist' Islam.

The new propaganda of the Islamic threat in Indonesia was basically adduced by the emergence of inter-religious conflict (violence) in 1999-2001 in the Poso, Maluku Island where the Laskar Jihad was formed to

help the Muslim community which involved the war against the Christian community and then other conflicts that emerged across Indonesia such as Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Aceh.<sup>1</sup> This paper attempts to revisit the nature and extent of the Islamic threat in Indonesia and thus finally argues that it has been nothing except forwarding the sense of Islamophobia for obtaining the western interest, especially the US.

### **The September 11 Tragedy and Sensationalistic Journalistic Coverage: Milestones for Waging Islamophobia**

The September 11 tragedy has resulted in the different perceptions in the world. Though the Western and Muslim world tend to condemn the September 11 attacks on the twin towers and Pentagon, but they differ in interpretation as it is grounded in different interests, values and assumptions. In the Western countries for example, people in fact perceived that the attack was an attack on them as a people and as a nation state.<sup>2</sup> As such in the United States, patriotism surged and the whole nation was caught up in an emotional experience of solidarity that had not been seen since World War II. Most Americans felt that the attacks were not only attacks on the specific targets as nation- state, but it is also attacks on them as a people and as a nation state. For this different reason, nationalism has been on the rise in the Western and European countries fuelled by resentment towards immigrants.<sup>3</sup> As a result, there were emerged sporadic attacks against Muslim immigrants and their symbols of existence, indicating the increase of anti-Islamic sentiments.<sup>4</sup>

With this tragedy, it indicates the beginning of New World politics by the emergence of the issue of global terrorism. The United States, as the only superpower in the world now, only needs the support from its own people to total war against global terrorism which later on being associated with *al-Qaeda* movement led by Osama bin Laden. Due to the anti-Islamic sentiments intertwined with the anti-terrorists campaigns, American people whole heartedly supported the plan to execute the total war against the global terrorists.<sup>5</sup> As reaction to the September attacks, the United States attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001. This support was to some extent indicated by the smooth process of the United States Congress's approval on the budget for the war against terrorism, and re-election of Bush for the second presidential term in the last year elections. Indeed, this phenomenon confirms the conventional wisdom as it says that an external threat tends to increase nationalism.

In addition, the September tragedy also led to the re-emergence of nationalism in the Western countries, where the people's sense of belonging to the state were strengthened and it, thus, also strengthened rights of the state to commit the violence is perceived as self-evident.

Coincided with anti-terrorist campaigns by the United States, the Western people and their government, as it repeatedly arguing, perceived that what was happening to the United States in the September 11, was perceived as a threat to the whole nation. As such, it is the state to be the only actor that can protect people from terrorism.<sup>6</sup>

In contrast, Muslims perceived that the September tragedy is actually the exaggerated and fabricated events. President George W. Bush who got weaker support from people of the American citizens was accused to have deployed a political strategy that could gain full support and unite them under his leadership in combating the terrorism all over the world, especially Muslim countries. As a result, Osama Bin Laden, who has not been even clear until now, was accused for being a responsible person for the attack. The US through its CIA (Center of Intelligence Agency) investigated all Islamic movements all over the world. CIA officers alarmed Islamic movements in Middle Eastern countries, Indian Pakistan subcontinents, and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Indonesia was accused as the center of al-Qaeda's network in the region under the leadership of Abu Bakar Baasyir through his movement known as "Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI)."<sup>7</sup>

The world has still been doubtful on who is behind the September 11 tragedy. This doubt has been supported by many facts. Firstly, the absence of number of Jews on the day the World Trade Center was attacked. Secondly, the list of the passengers of the flight were fabricated for after sometimes it shows that there was not Arabic names in the list as it was claimed in the second days after the attack. Thirdly, according to some writings that even the names that have been in the list was list of people who passed away one or two years ago. Fourthly, there were the attempts in the United States' movement that call for re-opening the case. Finally, the attack was, according to some witnesses, begun by the explosion in the ground of the building.<sup>8</sup> As such, neither excessive cynicism nor elaborate conspiracy theorizing is necessary to raise doubts about certain agenda behind the September 11 tragedy as the US government implemented their own strategy to gain their interest over the targeted nations across the Muslim world. All of the US policies of the war against terrorist are only to discriminate Islamic politics all over the world, especially those who become troubles makers for the implementation of the US agenda.

### **Alarmist account of the Islamic Threat in Indonesia**

Upon the tragedy of September 11, the United States declared the total war against global terrorists. President George W. Bush repeatedly insisted that he would not stop war against global terrorists until each terrorist group of the global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.<sup>9</sup> In this

counterterrorism, the United States has been employing various strategies which were considered effective in combating the terrorism, including combining military actions, law-enforcement, the freezing of financial assets, and repeatedly drives for the international cooperation.<sup>10</sup> However, in responding to the call from America to combat the terrorists in the country and the region, Indonesia at the earlier time was very much hesitant. This hesitant attitude of Indonesian officers was only before the Bali bombings in 2002.

Despite the fact, Singapore as the first country in the Southeast Asian region who captured the so called the members of previously unknown group "Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI)" believed to have links to al-Qaeda and then followed by Malaysia in December 2001, Indonesia was still disputing the fact.<sup>11</sup> This can be seen at the early phase of counter terrorism, where Indonesian National Crime Bureau Internal Secretary, Brigadier Dadang Garnida, insisted that Jama'ah Islamiyah had link to certain terrorist organization were yet full with lack of evidence. As he says,

"So far we have only established that the movement is based on solidarity... Islamic solidarity... Until now, we have no evidence to link it to any terrorist movements so we are now co-operating with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines for greater intelligence pertaining this issue."<sup>12</sup>

Nevertheless, the Western countries, especially America, Australia and Britain and the small neighboring country Singapore, keep accusing Indonesia as the center of terrorism in Southeast Asian region. Indonesia as the largest Muslim country in the world was accused a nest for growing Islamic terrorism and Southeast Asian region, thus, was quickly identified as the second front of war against global terrorist. This propaganda was then supported by the emergence of series of bombings such as October 2002 bombing of nightclub in Bali, which finally established the reality of threat in Indonesia. It was subsequently confirmed by the explosions at the Marriot hotel in Jakarta in 2003, outside the Australian embassy in Jakarta in 2004 and again in Bali in 2005.<sup>13</sup>

Therefore, the past six years have witnessed the proliferation of journalistic, academic, think tank and government reports and studies concerned with the Islamic threat in Indonesia. Journalistic writings like *Times*, *TV MNSBC*, *the Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *CNN*, and other media which is in line or pros towards the US propaganda reported the real terrorist threat in Indonesia. Among academician, government reports as well as policy makers best exemplified by Zachary Abuza, an American academic, prolific author, and frequent media commentator whose work has come to enjoy broad circulation and coverage.<sup>14</sup> Over several years he has produced a series of books, reports and articles

presenting a distinctly alarmist Islamic threat in Southeast Asia, especially in Indonesia. Furthermore, the episodes of religious violence in Indonesia occasioned a steady stream of reportage on Islamic terrorism ranging from the fine-gained investigative work pioneered by Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group to more sensationalistic journalistic coverage.<sup>15</sup> This coverage combined with media reports on a wide range of spotlights Islamist violence, assertiveness and aggression.

However this alarmist account is actually based on uncritical over reliance on official sources drawn from the security service of the region as what has been over propagated by the prolific writer like Abu Zachary and Rohan Gunaratna.<sup>16</sup> Likewise, what has been reported by the International Crisis Group is based on sources of direct interrogation of the terrorist suspects where the conditions under which they were produced out of force and intimidations, extortion, torture of prisoners. Secondly, this alarmist account also leaves entirely unanswered crucial question about the nature and extent of these activities. For instance, why the bombing occurred only that time and certain location? For example, the series of Bombings from Bali – Jakarta-Bali axis remained with the full doubt though the suspects were arrested and some were sentenced to the death. The explosion of the Bali bomb in 2002 triggered to the renewed worries and anxieties about terrorism in Indonesia. As such, Indonesian government took efforts seriously and resubmitted the bill-anti terrorist to the parliament as the national agenda.

Responding to the Bali bombing, all Muslim communities cursed who ever the actors behind it. However, many Muslim leaders perceived that Bali bombing that killed more than 200 hundreds people including Australian and American is series of conspiracies that aimed to alarm Indonesian citizens and their government on the danger of the terrorism. Many Muslims in Indonesia believed that the Bali bomb was CIA's network so that the US will gain more support from Indonesia to combat the terrorism.<sup>17</sup> Given the fact that Megawati government remained being hesitant and the Indonesian officers denied the existence of the terrorists and their networks Indonesia. On the other hand, the army and foreign Intelligence has been accused by the Muslims as the force behind the Bali blasts as attempt to show the danger of the terrorist attack.

This accusation was based on several reasons; first the ingredient of the bomb was made out of C4 which the American only has the bomb. Second shortly after the bomb exploited, there were many American naval surrounded the Bali.<sup>18</sup> Third, chronologically, Indonesian Muslims cursed the United States' aggression on Afghanistan. On the other occasion, the US ambassador said that Indonesian Muslims are moderates and do not follow an Islamic ideology in their movement. However, the following day,

the bomb was exploited in Bali. As such, Muslims still believed that though several Muslim fundamentalists have been captured and declared guilty but there were still facts that confused many people. Lately the convicted guilty appealed to the court that their confession was out of force which may nullify the declaration. As a result, the execution of the death penalty has been done after long time of postponement. As such there was an indication of political conspiracy that tried to destabilize Indonesia.<sup>19</sup>

It is worth noting that there are at least three points that are significantly found in the Bali blasts. First, the investigation revealed that the Bali attack was carried out by a group of obscure individuals rather than by well known groups such as FPI (Fron Pembela Islam), Laskar Jihad, and MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia). Though the MMI was to some extent accused but the last investigation did not find any direct and concrete evidence linking MMI especially its leader, Abu Bakar Baasyir to the Bali tragedy. Second, Bali blast points to the existence of the international terrorist in Indonesia. The Indonesian authority shortly indicated the possible links with al-Qaeda.<sup>20</sup>

Third, Bali bombing is related to the capacity of Indonesia in coping with the Threat of terrorism in general. In this regard, four weaknesses are the immediate causes in the tragedy; first, Policy weaknesses and the limited capacity of the Indonesian intelligence. Secondly, Indonesia's porous border and the limited capacity of the state to guard them. Thirdly, it showed the lack of law enforcement and the corrupt mentality of the law enforcers themselves. Fourthly, the corrupt mentality of the state bureaucracy, especially among the immigration officers, those allow the flourishing of falsified documentation.<sup>21</sup>

Regardless the different opinions on the result of investigation on the Bali bomb on October 12, 2002, Indonesian government began taking serious efforts in combating the terrorism. President Megawati has been granted broad emergency power, pending the passage of a permanent anti-terror law.<sup>22</sup> Indonesia also established a central counterterrorism agency with the ability to detain suspects without trial and suspend privacy laws in investigation. Lastly out of the Bali bombing, Megawati made death as the maximum penalty for terrorism.<sup>23</sup> In a move applauded by Western governments, Indonesian authorities attempted to detain the alleged Jama'ah Islamiyah leader Abu Bakar Baasyir in the late October after the long procedures due to the hindrance of the supporter.

As a result, as Gunaratna commented that Megawati placed her personal and political carrier before national and regional security, and therefore Indonesia has been hesitant to target the al-Qaeda network in Indonesia. Even after the event of Bali bombing on October 12, 2002, Indonesia is only targeting Jama'ah Islamiyah members directly connected

to the explosion. Indonesia has been neither targeting JI as organization nor its political wing such as Mujahidin Council of Indonesia and Its militia wing such as Laskar Jundullah as claimed by the Western analysts.<sup>24</sup> Likewise, the Indonesian government took the same efforts to investigate the suspects of the rest of the Bombing incidents in Jakarta with different arrangement but the same objective and modes operandi.

### **What is Jama'ah Islamiyah?**

Jama'ah Islamiyah (JI) in the Southeast Asia is suddenly famous after the September 11 tragedy. In identifying the international terrorist networks in Southeast Asia, Jama'ah Islamiyah was identified as Islamic organization that aims at the establishment of an Islamic state in the region compressed of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The western countries especially the US and Australia accused Jama'ah Islamiyah as part of the International terrorist organization, al-Qaeda. Jama'ah Islamiyah was accused involved at the series of bombings in Bali, and since then Indonesian government agreed to include Jama'ah Islamiyah as the 88<sup>th</sup> organization that listed by the UN as an terrorist organization.

The question arises is that is there real Jama'ah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia? Muslims in Southeast Asia have been doubtful on the existence of the Jama'ah Islamiyah in the region, though some government officers from the countries like Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and later Indonesia confirmed the existence. The UN and other western countries do not have enough information about the headquarters of Jama'ah Islamiyah, its structure and leader of JI. Abu Bakar Baasyir was accused as the leader in the Southeast Asia, but he refused and the Majles Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian *Ulama* Council (MUI) negated the existence of JI in Indonesia.

According to Alfitra, Indonesian researcher in the Indonesian institute of Science (LIPI) Jama'ah Islamiyah appeared firstly in the Southeast Asian writings was only in Malaysia and Singapore. In Malaysia was only appeared in local papers which are tightly controlled by the government. At the same times, Singapore published the white paper exposing the Terrorist Plans in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, Jama'ah Islamiyah was referred and broadcasted widely as alleged organization that involved with series of terror in the region by the International Crisis Group (ICG). The ICG later reported on August 12, 2002 that this Jama'ah Islamiyah was formed by the Indonesian military, though was negated by other international media.<sup>25</sup> Sidney Jones referred to the link between Jama'ah Islamiyah and Darul Islam which aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.<sup>26</sup>

Indonesia is burdened by a legacy of manipulation and fabrication of violence that aimed at discriminating and tarnishing the image of Islamic political force. As it was evident in Indonesian New Order operation towards the Islamic political force that the new established intelligence used the violence that discriminated the image of Islam coincided with the government strategic plan to eradicate the influence of the Islamic political party Masyumi in 1970s. Cases in points are violence in 1970s and 1980s such as *Imran gang*, *Komando jihad*, and Tanjung Priok cases which aimed at discrediting Islamic political forces. The Imran gang was believed that was army who made the gang and exaggerated an event where the police stations in Cicendo was bombed in 1970s. Komando jihad was a group that underwent hijacking the airplane in 1978. Furthermore, Tanjung Priok was the reaction towards the army who dishonored the Mosque by entering it without removing their shoes which finally killed many Muslims and arrested Muslims who only appeared to have been publicly opposing the government policies in 1984.<sup>27</sup>

Consequently, public trust in the competence and reliability of the security agencies in all time after the fall of Suharto has been very low. It has been shown in every conflict which involved the violence in all over Indonesia after the demise of Suharto such as Maluku, Ambon, and Kalimantan which to some extent were triggered because of complicated socio-economic gap and later on accelerated to the racial and religious conflicts. In these dark events, the effectiveness, and competence and reliability of the security agencies such as police, army and intelligence agencies have been deteriorated due to the elite army conflict in their formidable powers and capabilities curtailed through political intrusion, inter agency rivalry, lack of funding and the mergence of more accountability structures aimed at preventing arbitrary arrest and human right violations.<sup>28</sup>

Jama'ah Islamiyah is basically a generic term that refers to any congregation of devout Muslims. It is in fact found everywhere in Indonesia, and gradually becomes the common in many cities in Indonesia. As it has been noted that since the mid 1980s, Indonesian Muslims began to realize their Islamic awareness and tend to practice the Islamic teachings in private as well as public life.

Finally, Islamic community including moderate Muslim groups to see that the war against terrorist is just another replica of Indonesian experience of exaggerated terror in order to tarnish the image of Islam. It has been in fact, re-action of the United States to the phenomenon of the emerging opposition from the Muslim world. As center for International and Strategic studies of the American think tank institution suggests that it was evident that Islamic revivalism within the Muslims nations are



gradually taken place. Internationally the United States as the only superpower in the world would like to block any emerging nation or global power that challenges their status as the world police. It is evident with the propaganda of the Western scholars and government who are of the opinion of the clash of civilizations and they attempt for waging the Islamophobia across the Muslim world.

### Conclusion

It is clear that the sources of information on this broader Islamic threat after all are overwhelmingly anti-Islamist in orientation and opposed to the extension of Islamic influence in the social and political life of the region. On the other hand, many of Islamist sources are also misleadingly triumphant in tone, trumpeting successes that are exaggerated or unrepresentative of broader trends. As such, special attempts to reduce the tension between the two different reporting and perception are needed. Muslim reporters as well as western media should share the fact and reveal the genuine data.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> For further elaboration on Laskar Jihad, see Noorhaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia*, Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.
- <sup>2</sup> Bernard Adeney Risakotta, "The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia," in K.S. Nathan and Muhammad Hashim Kamali (eds.), *Islam in Southeast Asia: Political, Social and Strategic Challenges for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005, p. 327.
- <sup>3</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>4</sup> Abdurahman Alamoudi, "Image of Muslims in America", A paper presented on International Workshop organized by Just World Trust, Kuala Lumpur, 7-9 October, 1995.
- <sup>5</sup> Bernard Adeney Risakotta, "The Impact of September 11 on Islam in Southeast Asia," p. 327.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>7</sup> Since then there are many writings on Islam and Terrorism in Southeast Asia such as Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya," in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*. Vol. 25. No. 2. August 2003, pp. 169-199; "Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: Exploring the Linkages," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan. *After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in Southeast Asia*, Singapore: World Scientific Publications Pte Ltd. 2003, pp. 133-157; and his *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, London: Lynne Rienne Publishers Inc. 2003; Gunaratna, Rohan. "Al-Qaeda's Origins: Threat and its likely Future," in Rohan Gunaratna (ed.), *Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response*, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003; Rabasa, Angel M. *Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals and Terrorists*, New

York: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003; David Wright Neville, "Dangereous Dynamics: Activitists, Militants and Terrorists in Southeast Asia." in *The Pacific Review*, vol. 17 no. 1, March 2004, pp. 26 - 46; Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.), *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia: Myth and Realities*, Australia: Monash Asia Institute, 2005.

- <sup>8</sup> For further elaboration on this accusation, see various reports of Islamonline.net. As imam Anwar Awlaki suggested that Israeli intelligence agents might have been responsible for the attacks, and that the FBI went into the roster of the airplanes and whoever had a Muslim or Arab name became the hijacker by default. See also *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2008.
- <sup>9</sup> As it was addressed by President George W. Bush at joint session of Congress and the American people on November 21, 2001. See for example, Ajai Sahni, "The Locus of Error: Has the gravity of Terrorism "Shifted" in Asia?" in Rohan Gunaratna (ed.), *Terrorism in the Asia- Pacific; Threat and Response*, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003, p. 5; see also the text of speech available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html>.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>11</sup> The government of Singapore issues the white paper containing the Jama'ah Islamiyah terrorist plans. See Singapore Ministry of Homes Affairs, *White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the threat of Terrorism*, Singapore: Ministry of Home affairs, January 7, 2003.
- <sup>12</sup> It has been reported in the Second Annual ASEAN Senior Official meeting on transnational crime, Kuala Lumpur Malaysia from Maya 15 - 17, 2002. See "Indonesia no Evidence Liking Group to Terror," in *New Straits Time*, May 17, 2002. See also Elina Noor, *Terrorism in Malaysia: Situation and Response*, in Gunaratna, *Terrorism in the Asia*, p. 173.
- <sup>13</sup> See Marika Vicziany and David Wright-Neville (eds.), *Islamic Terrorism in Indonesia*.
- <sup>14</sup> Zachary Abuza, who has little expertise in the countries of the Southeast Asia region, has produced more than six books which have been well and broader circulated. These include Zachary Abuza, 2002, "Tentacles of Terror: al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network". 2003, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*. 2004, *Muslims, Politics, and Violence in Indonesia: an Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?*. 2005, "the Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of Revolution". 2006, *Balik Terrorism: The return of Abu Sayyaf*. And 2007, *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia*.
- <sup>15</sup> Sidney John has been the Southeast Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group (ICG) since 2002. The ICG has been reporting the latest and updated activities of the so-called "terrorist cells in Southeast Asia", and to some extent propagating and exaggerating the alarm of threat of Terrorism in Indonesia. The well documented ICG reports, however, cite sworn statement of jailed terrorist suspects without questioning the interrogation conditions under which they were produced; where intimidations, extortion, and torture of prisoners are routine practices. See for examples, International Crisis Group (ICG) 2002a, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of the "Ngruki Network "in Indonesia*. 2002b, *Indonesia Background: How the Jama'ah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*. 2003, *Jama'ah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous*. 2004a, *Indonesia Background: Jihad in Central Sulawesi*. 2004d, *Indonesia Background: Why Salafism*

and terrorism mostly don't mix. 2005a, *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*. 2005c, *Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*. 2006a, *Terrorism in Indonesia: Nordin's Networks*.

- <sup>16</sup> Rohan Gunaratna is the prolific writer who links the Terrorist network in Southeast Asia and is known as an expert of Terrorism who produced a controversial book in 2002 entitled *Inside al-Qaeda: global networks of terror*. See also Rohan Gunaratna (ed.), *Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response*, Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003.
- <sup>17</sup> Interview with Ahmad Sumargono, Jakarta, March 22, 2006.
- <sup>18</sup> Idi Subandy Ibrahim & Asep Symasul M. Romli, *Amerika, Terrorisme dan Islamophobia*, Bandung: Nuansa, 2007, p. 115.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Rizal Sukma, Indonesia and the Challenge of Radical Islam after October 12," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, *After Bali the Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia*, Singapore: World and Scientific Publishing co. Pte. Lte. & Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003, p. 351.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup> For further response of Indonesian government toward the terrorists, see Jawahir Thontowi, "The Islamic Perspective of the War on Terrorism and Current Indonesian Responses," a paper presented at the Human Right 2003: The Year in Review Conference held by the Castan Center for Human rights Law, Monash Law School, Melbourne, 4 December 2003, pp. 19-20.
- <sup>23</sup> Jonathan T. Chow, "ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation since 9/11," in *Asian Survey*, Vol. 45, no. 2 2005, p. 315. (pp. 302-321); see also Tim Dodd, "Emergency Powers for Megawati," in *Australian Financial Review*, October 19, 2002.
- <sup>24</sup> Rohan Gunaratna, "Al-Qaeda's Origins: Threat and its likely Future," in Rohan Gunaratna, *Terrorist in the Asia*, p. 149.
- <sup>25</sup> Idi Subandy Ibrahim & Asep Symasul M. Romli, *Amerika, Terrorisme*, p. 104.
- <sup>26</sup> See, for example, Sidney Jones, *Indonesia Background: How the Jama'ah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*.
- <sup>27</sup> For further reading on the operation of the Indonesian intelligence (military) on the discrimination against the political Islam, see David Jenkins, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983*, Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesian Project, 1984.
- <sup>28</sup> Leonard C. Sebastian, "The Indonesian Dilemma: How to Participate in the War on Terror Without Becoming a National Security State," in Kumar Ramakrishna and See Seng Tan, *After Bali The Threat of Terrorism Southeast Asia*, Singapore: World and Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Lte. & Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, 2003. p. 358.